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WHAT WE STILL DON’T KNOW ABOUT WHAT PERSUADES
JUDGES – AND SOME WAYS WE MIGHT FIND OUT
Ted Becker*
Over 25 years ago, in his foreword to the first volume of
Legal Writing, Chris Rideout nailed it: legal writing as
actually practiced by lawyers and judges needs to improve,
“[b]ut more fundamental inquiry into legal writing . . . is
needed as well.”1 The intervening decades have seen many
laudable efforts on the latter front, as our collective scholarly
discipline, then in its infancy, has matured. But one particular
question that Rideout identified remains largely unaddressed
by our discipline, although recent developments suggest a
welcome increase in attention to the topic. Specifically,
Rideout explained that our field did not know as much as we
would like about how legal documents are “actually read.” His
diagnosis was concise: “Much of the existing literature about
legal writing . . . offer[s] fairly prescriptive advice about
organization and style. Very little of this advice, however, is
based on research into the ways in which legal documents are
actually written or read. Rather, it largely depends upon timehonored, general maxims for writing, translated into the
language of legal writing . . . .”2 As all LRW professors know,
legal writing in practice is by its nature often unavoidably
complex both substantively and stylistically, making it
imperative for the discipline to try to unpack those
complexities to suss out what makes legal prose effective. To
Rideout, it was “distressing” that we do not know – we in fact
“need to know” – such matters as “what a judge responds to
stylistically in a brief, or a client in reading an opinion letter,
a will, or a contract.”3
Do we know more now than we did then? Yes. Do we
know as much as we could, or should? No. This holds for many
aspects of legal writing, but my jumping-off point in this short
essay is the specific topic of what rhetorical techniques
actually persuade judges. A gap persists between what we
think we know and what we actually do know about whether
Ted Becker is a Clinical Professor of Law and the Director of the
Legal Practice Program at the University of Michigan Law School.
1 J. Christopher Rideout, Research and Writing about Legal
Writing: A Foreword from the Editor, 1 LEG. WRITING v, v (1991).
2 Id. at vi.
3 Id.
*
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and, to a slightly lesser extent, how and why rhetoric
influences judicial decisions. Below, I set out some quick and
necessarily incomplete thoughts on why this actually is a
problem worth addressing. I follow by identifying some holes
in our knowledge that several scholars have started to try to
fill, and some obstacles we might face along the way.
The Problem(s)
As Rideout mentioned, much of what we teach our
students about legal writing boils down to “time-honored,
general maxims.”4 That observation, as applied to what
students learn about persuasion, reflects the undeniable fact
that many persuasive techniques stem in some way or another
from the teaching of classical rhetoricians. Aristotle’s
influential division of effective rhetoric into logos, ethos, and
pathos is overtly acknowledged in many legal writing scholars’
works about advocacy,5 and implicitly underlies much if not
most of the rest. Put simply, like the many generations before
ours who have looked to the classical rhetoricians for
guidance in how to construct powerful arguments, our field
collectively believes that these approaches work.
I’m no exception. Classical and current formulations of
how to appeal to an audience’s sometimes-conflicting senses
of justice, fair play, and naked self-interest correspond
generally to my observations and personal and professional
experience about how people make decisions in legal and nonlegal situations. The same holds for guidance framed in terms
of reason and emotion, of syllogism and story and an
advocate’s credibility. I teach my students accordingly.
I’ve become less and less certain, however, sometimes as
a result of insightful student questions, about how solid the
foundation is for at least some of the techniques I encourage
students to use. It’s not that I think a particular technique or
rhetorical approach is ineffective or, worse, counterproductive; if I did, I wouldn’t encourage students to use it.
Id.
E.g., RUTH ANNE ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN, AND KEN CHESTEK,
YOUR CLIENT’S STORY: PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING 23 (2013) (“The
principles that [Aristotle] developed remain just as relevant today
as they were at the time he was writing.”); Scott Fraley, A Primer on
Essential Classical Rhetoric for Practicing Attorneys, 14 LEG.
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 99, 101 (2017) (“Indeed, a great many
of the rhetorical concepts discussed herein infiltrate our everyday
lexicon and usage, so that techniques like the ancient Greeks
originated and taught may seem like second nature to some
practitioners.”).
4
5
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But I occasionally hesitate to justify my recommendations due
to what seem to me to be ultimately unsatisfying rationales.
For example, I might explain the reason(s) I or others believe
a technique to be effective. Is this only a sophisticated “just
so” story?
Alternatively, I might explain that lots of commentators
and experienced attorneys say that judges prefer particular
techniques. Sometimes I can invoke judges themselves who
say that about something or another. But this isn’t really a
convincing reason. I of course believe judges who say they
prefer a particular technique. Preference is a poor proxy,
however, for whether using or not using a technique actually
plays any role in shaping a judge’s decision. Judges, like
anyone else, are often unaware of subtle influences on why
they decide as they do; speaking broadly, legal realism
suggests that their supposedly rational basis for making a
decision may not be the actual basis for doing so, and in fact
may be flatly at odds with that “real” reason.6
To the extent my reactions are representative of other
legal writing professors, two questions come to mind that I
believe are likely shared by others. First, do these persuasive
techniques actually have the claimed positive effect? Second,
if so, why do they have that effect?
Do Rhetorical Techniques Perform as Advertised?
Properly answering the first question is largely a matter
of empirical study, and in that sense both tracks and goes
beyond one of the underpinnings of classical rhetoric.
Aristotle’s and other classical rhetorical texts, like similar
texts today, combine aspects of (among other things)
observation and theory. As to the former, Aristotle’s Rhetoric
is on one level a lengthy description of the techniques that
advocates used in classical-era law courts and political fora,
accompanied by observations about whether and when these
techniques seemed to prove effective.
This disconnect can lead to disturbing results. As one
representative example, see Holger Spamann and Lars Klöhn,
Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought:
Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEG. STUD.
255, 270 (2016) (describing statistically significant results of an
experiment in which actual judges were asked to make a ruling
about a hypothetical criminal conviction, taking into account both
a single precedent and either positive or negative facts about the
defendant, and upheld the conviction of the unsympathetic
defendant at a rate more than twice as high as that of the
sympathetic defendant (87-41%)).
6
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Modern scholars naturally can’t hope to replicate
classical-era rhetoricians’ contemporaneous observations
about what seemed to be persuasive millennia ago. But we can
and should devote more attention to trying to determine
empirically what seems to work now. Sophisticated statistical
methods give us tools Aristotle didn’t have. These methods
allow us to overcome the deficiencies of so-called “anecdata”
by rigorously assessing whether and to what extent particular
techniques actually do influence judges’ decisions.
Several recent works by legal writing scholars exemplify
the sort of analysis needed to start bringing some certainty to
often-untested assumptions. The first, published in the
current volume of this journal, examines whether a brief’s
overall readability influences whether a party is likely to
prevail on summary judgment.7 In their article, Shaun
Spencer and Adam Feldman study a collection of briefs filed
in state and federal courts, and conclude that “a statistically
significant relationship [exists] between brief readability and
the outcome of summary judgment motions.”8 They suggest
potential explanations for their results,9 and identify
additional research questions that their study poses.10
In the second article, another survey of actual briefs, John
Campbell set himself the task of measuring “whether there is
a measurable relationship between writing style and
winning.”11 Accordingly, he examined briefs from three
appellate courts. His results, although not statistically
significant, were consistent with the hypothesis that stylistic
choices affect the chances of winning on appeal.12
Finally, Ken Chestek designed an experiment to examine
whether negativity bias – “the brain's natural inclination to
attend to and process negative stimuli” – affected judges’
perceptions of a hypothetical case.13 Chestek created eight
separate preliminary statements for a summary judgment
brief, expressing either positive or negative themes, plus a

Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman, Words Count: The Empirical
Relationship Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment
Success, 22 LEG. WRITING (2018).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 John Campbell, Writing That Wins: An Empirical Study of
Appellate Briefs, 46 COLO. LAW., no. 3, Mar. 2017, at 85.
12 Id. at 87.
13 Kenneth D. Chestek, Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing:
An Empirical Study of the Effects of the Negativity Bias, 14 LEG.
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 2 (2017).
7
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neutral control.14 After reading one of the preliminary
statements and some other materials, judges were asked
which party they were inclined to favor.15 Results were mixed:
“In some situations, negative themes seem to be important in
priming a reader to disfavor the opposing party; in other
situations negative themes backfire.”16 Chestek draws out
various implications of his results, while recognizing that the
artificial nature of his experiment limits how solid those
implications are.17
These articles start a discussion that more of us in the
discipline of legal writing should join.18 They illustrate
different ways of approaching the empirical uncertainty
(measuring the results in actual cases versus carefully
designed experiments) and attempt to assess both broadbased and narrow rhetorical matters (readability, which
draws in many different considerations, versus a specific
emphasis on negative priming). They are properly cautious in
the conclusions they draw, recognizing that their results
might be explained for reasons other than those the authors
propose, or believed to be likely before the study began. They
leave open many further questions to be explored – not the
least of which is replicating their results, an important though
unglamorous part of any scientific inquiry. Future researchers
may wish to design studies or experiments that attempt to
drill down still further, measuring the impact of specific
stylistic techniques.19 And, it bears emphasizing, none of these
studies explain the causal connections that might be at work,
or establish that such a relationship even exists. Finding a
statistically significant correlation between a particular
rhetorical measure and a positive (or negative) result doesn’t
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16-17.
16 Id. at 2.
17 Id. at 34-35.
18 To be sure, earlier articles have empirically assessed whether
judges or other legal readers prefer various stylistic options. See, for
example, the sources cited in Spencer & Feldman, supra note 7.
These results are useful starting points but in my view are subject
to a flaw of any surveys of preferences in this setting: what readers
say they prefer is not necessarily what actually persuades them.
There are, of course, other reasons besides a direct impact on
persuasion for advocates to structure their writing in line with their
readers’ preferences.
19 Following the lead of Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen,
Clearly, Using Intensifiers Is Very Bad—Or Is It?, 45 ID. L. REV. 171
(2008) (measuring the relationship between the use of intensifiers
in appellate briefs and success on appeal).
14
15

46

The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute

Vol. 22

imply causation. That something appears to work doesn’t
explain why.
Why Do Rhetorical Techniques Work?
Instead, causation raises a different issue, the second
question posed above: why these persuasive techniques
appear to work. Returning to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, some of his
theoretical explanation along these lines rested on positions
about what it means to be human – man as a “rational
animal,” for example – and what those positions suggested
about why and how particular persuasive techniques would be
expected to work. To put it gently, those assumptions are not
widely accepted today in the light of some 2000-years’ worth
of scientific advances. Alternate explanations are needed.
LRW scholarship has made progress here, advancing the
ball by beginning to explore the scientific underpinnings that
help explain why various rhetorical techniques might have the
effect that they do. A few examples: Kathryn Stanchi has
explored a number of these topics in depth, such as her
influential article that explores social science research on
persuasion as applied to how legal advocates should present a
court with negative information about their client or
position.20 She and Linda Berger have recently published a
textbook combining their interests in science and persuasion,
setting themselves the ambitious goal of “unit[ing] persuasion
science with rhetorical theory and the real-life practice of
persuasion.”21 In doing so, they combine insights from both
classical and contemporary rhetoricians with lessons from
contemporary persuasion science, emphasizing cognitive and
social psychology.22 Lucy Jewell has looked at classical
rhetorical categories through the cognitive science lenses of
categorization theory and information processing. From this
investigation, she concludes that although classical categories
don’t mirror how humans actually think, our belief that they
See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 381 (2008). In another work, she draws lessons from cognitive
science, and particularly the process of cognitive dissonance, to
help advise lawyers about the tone they might wish to adopt in their
advocacy – in other words, how hard they might want to push a
position. See Kathryn M. Stanchi, What Cognitive Dissonance Tells
Us about Tone in Persuasion, 22 J.L. POL’Y 93 (2013).
21 LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL PERSUASION: A
RHETORICAL APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE 3 (2017). A review of the
book appears in Volume 22.
22 Id. at 7.
20
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do “closely approximates how we best respond when complex
information is presented to us.”23
These works are models for how legal writing scholars
might approach trying to provide a scientific grounding for
legal writing. As Lance Long as observed, however, there’s not
as much of this sort of scholarship as our discipline might
wish. Indeed, he and Catherine Cameron have written a
helpful textbook compiling scientific support for various
aspects of legal writing, ranging from substantive reasoning to
organization to style and even citation.24 But as Long later
explained, the book didn’t contain as many purely legal
writing studies as the authors had hoped, for the simple
reason that there weren’t many such studies to include.25
A Related Gap: The Connection Between Persuasion
and Prediction
Another reason for scholars to explore the sorts of topics
addressed in this essay is that doing so might help us get a
better handle on a deeper problem inherent in making
predictions about anything related to legal decision-making.
Work by Mark Osbeck delves into why accurately predicting
the outcomes of legal disputes is so difficult.26 Our discipline
emphasizes the importance of making accurate predictions –
the first semester of many an LRW course is devoted to how
lawyers communicate such predictions to supervisors and
clients – but, as Osbeck explains, the impediments to doing so
are surprisingly undertheorized in legal writing scholarship.27
For example, studies conducted by academics in other
fields reveal the persistent and systematic errors that
professionals make when rendering predictions – errors that
tend to put a thumb on the scales in favor of a client’s
interests. Accountants overestimate the likelihood that
Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive
Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEG.
COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 39, 77 (2016).
24 See CATHERINE J. CAMERON & LANCE N. LONG, THE SCIENCE
BEHIND THE ART OF LEGAL WRITING (2015).
25 Lance N. Long, Is There Any Science Behind the Art of Legal
Writing?, 16 WYO. L REV 287, 287-88 (2016).
26 Mark K. Osbeck, Using Data Analytics Tools to Supplement
Traditional Research and Analysis in Forecasting Case Outcomes,
20 LEG. WRITING 33, 34-35 (2015) (identifying factors that can skew
predictions using traditional case analysis).
27 See Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the
Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law 2
(February 4, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23
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financial measures will or will not pass muster, depending on
whether they represent a hypothetical regulatory agency or
reporting company.28 Doctors overestimate the time that
terminal patients will likely survive.29 Similar studies about
lawyers – by non-legal writing scholars – reach similar
results: experienced attorneys overpredict the chances of a
successful result in ways that mirror the position of their
clients.30 Even law students get into the act: in moot court
exercises, students randomly assigned to one side or the other
tend to overpredict their hypothetical client’s odds of
victory.31
LRW professors recognize the biases that all lawyers (and
all people) confront, of course; we acknowledge them in class
discussions and instruct students how they might be able to
reduce (although not wholly eliminate) the impact of such
biases. Pedagogically, this serves our students well. From a
scholarly perspective, though, one area that’s ripe for further
exploration is trying to assess how the uncertainty in how
judges make decisions intersects with the inevitable biases
lawyers face in predicting those decisions, and what that
intersection suggests for how we teach students to make
predictions.
Conclusion
Many LRW professors, myself included, might be
interested in empirical work, but lack formal training in
conducting such research. As Spencer says, empirical research

Don A. Moore et al., Auditor Independence, Conflict of Interest,
and the Unconscious Intrusion of Bias 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper
No.
03-116,
2003),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c926/76e2a15c501512df3b3b8d
a5e9b3e918804f.pdf.
29 Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and
determinants of error in doctors' prognoses in terminally ill
patients: prospective cohort study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 369, 369
(2000).
30 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL., PUB. POLICY & L.
133, 133 (2010).
31 Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their
Own Hype, and Should They? A Natural Experiment, 42 J. LEG.
STUD. 239, 239 (2012).
28
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isn’t easy.32 Naturally enough, this might appear to be an
insurmountable obstacle to engaging in empirical work,
especially when considering the already extensive demands
on a professor’s time due to the heavy grading and other
student-facing obligations of our courses. This position is
completely understandable. In response, I’ll second Spencer’s
encouragement that “[g]iven the talent and energy among
legal writing faculty, we are well positioned to study what
lawyers write, and the lawyers who read and write it.”33 And,
much can be gained from reaching out to academics in other
specialties who do have expertise in empirical work,
potentially leading to interdisciplinary work that could reach
a broader audience.34 Long sums up the point well: “If we
want legal writing as a discipline to be taken seriously, we
must be able to show, through rigorous studies, that we
engage in serious legal writing scholarship.”35 Doing so,
whether in response to Chris Rideout’s unanswered questions
of 25 years ago or Long’s more recent challenge, can only
benefit our collective scholarly community.

Shaun B. Spencer, Using Empirical Methods to Study Legal
Writing, 20 LEG. WRITING 141, 141 (2015). His article contains
much useful information for professors looking to learn more about
how to make sense of empirical scholarship and/or conduct it
themselves. I’ve relied on it myself in developing an ongoing project
that tracks whether and how legal writing grades in a pass/fail
setting correlate to success in other law school classes.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 183-84; Long, supra note 26, at 298 (“Legal writing and
social science professionals need to corroborate to produce more
quality legal writing-based empirical scholarship to better serve our
law students and the legal profession generally.”).
35 Long, supra note 26, at 297.
32

